Global omnipresence12/19/2023 ![]() Similarly, on the face of it, the globalisation of information did not slow down. The number of international tourist arrivals rose from 900 million in 2009 to 1.4 billion in 2018. The stock of global migrants grew steadily from 190 million in 2005 to 243 million a decade later. In fact, the globalisation of people accelerated, although in a manner that was partial and subordinate to national interests. Other aspects of globalisation have not seen as much of a plateau after 2008. But the drivers have been different: Increases in energy efficiency, the rise of renewables, and new sources as a result of fracking. Net international energy trade, which stood at 1.5 billion tonnes of oil equivalent in 1990, swelled to 2.5 billion by 2008 but then grew only moderately to 2.8 billion by 2018. As one business leader cynically put it to me, “China, after climbing up the ladder, is kicking it out from under everyone else.” In hindsight, the economically nationalist impulses of countries as different as the US (“America First”) and India (“Make in India”) were a natural consequence.Ī similar flattening has been underway in the globalisation of energy. The assumption that China’s rise would result in similar development opportunities for others proved unfounded. ![]() The United States’ (US) sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007-08, and its spillover to the eurozone, exacerbated national sentiment in Europe, which had previously been a model of international integration. It became increasingly apparent that not all countries, societies, and people were benefitting equally from globalisation, and that soon began to be reflected in national and international politics. There are several causes for the great stagnation in the globalisation of goods and capital. Similarly, personal remittance flows, previously on the rise, flattened to around 0.75% of global GDP. But by 2018, it had dropped precipitously to 1.4%, its lowest level since 1996. Similarly, net foreign direct investment inflows, which were never under 1% of global GDP before 1989, occasionally crossed 4% over the past 30 years. Trade as a percentage of global GDP rose from 39% in 1991 to 61% in 2008 but has remained flat over the past decade. Trade without tariffs, international travel with easy or no visas, capital flows with few impediments, cross-border pipelines and energy grids, and seamless global communication in real-time appeared to be the natural endpoints towards which the world was moving, if at different rates for different places.īut the globalisation of goods and capital had already begun to plateau or stagnate since the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC). Over the past three decades, globalising trends were assumed to be the new normal. Globalisation is the accelerated flow of goods, people, capital, information, and energy across borders, often enabled by technological developments. ![]() ![]() One natural question is what Covid-19 will mean for globalisation. Some of the repercussions will be unexpected, and may not be felt immediately. It is natural for people to be considering the secondary implications of the pandemic. It is now evident that the coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19) is a systemic global event, one that will have significant consequences for people’s well-being and lifestyles, national economies, and political leaderships on every continent.
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